fix: unblock master (3 regressions) + fleet-pat-health watched 3 of 9 PAT repos + census roster reconcile - #811
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…_PAT The file's own header says "Add new fleet repos here when they receive GH_RELEASE_PAT". Nine repos hold it; FLEET_REPOS named three. The other six had NO expiry detection at all -- which is the single thing this workflow exists to provide, absent for two thirds of its subjects. FuzeCall, FuzeDeploy and FuzeMerchandize were provisioned the credential today via FuzeSDLC's provision-secrets.yml (run 32948657038, 3x SET GH_RELEASE_PAT), so they are added in the same change rather than left to be noticed later. FuzePlan already held it and was simply never listed. The list is not hand-assembled: it is exactly the repos whose OWN workflows reference secrets.GH_RELEASE_PAT to bump a prod tag, from the fleet-wide survey in provision_secrets.py. FuzeFront and FuzeSDLC are deliberately EXCLUDED despite holding the secret. Neither uses it to cut a release -- FuzeFront for this health check itself, FuzeSDLC for secret provisioning -- so listing them would query a release workflow that does not exist and report a failure that is not one. That hazard is real for a repo that IS in scope: FuzeMerchandize references the PAT from build-and-push.yml, not release.yml, and querying an absent workflow returns the same "Could not query" error as an expired credential. A false alarm here is not cosmetic -- it trains people to ignore the alert. So entries now accept an optional `=workflow.yml` override, defaulting to WORKFLOW_FILE. Verified: YAML parses; the entry parser resolves plain entries to release.yml and the override to build-and-push.yml. NOT labelled auto-merge. master is deploy-on-push in this repo, so merging is a production deploy -- merge in a deploy window, per the convention in #794. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaPa3JgrVNtWrGvqQEAEqv
…efects it reported about itself Census run 32949523555 against production emitted four warnings that were about the ROSTER, not about production, and each one manufactured a spurious MISSING row. A MISSING that means "this file is wrong" is indistinguishable from one that means "a product dropped out of the portal", which defeats the only thing this roster exists to detect. Three entries carry a slug the registry has never served: keys -> fuzekeys fuzecontact -> contact fuzehub-ventures -> fuzehub All three were reported MISSING while simultaneously appearing under their real slug in the "in the registry but not in expected-portal-apps.json" warnings -- the same product counted twice, once as absent and once as unexpected. One product was absent from the roster entirely: `clock`, which the registry returns and builtins.ts seeds. Corrected in the direction _meta.notASlugMigrationWorklist mandates: "If a live registry slug genuinely differs from an entry below, FIX THIS FILE to match the registry -- never the other way around." No product's registered slug is touched, per CLAUDE.md's immutable-slug rule. FuzeQuality is REMOVED rather than corrected. PR #810 (merged 05:07 today) deleted it from builtins.ts and added migration 011_suspend_phantom_fuzequality_builtin, because the product has no repository. Notably the same census still found it `activated` in prod serving a 200-that-is- HTML, so #810's migration has NOT run there yet. With the entry gone that now surfaces as an "in the registry but not expected" warning -- which is the correct signal for a phantom that is still live, and better than the FAIL row it produced while pretending to be a real product. Net effect on the same production data: MISSING drops from 9 to 6, and those 6 are genuinely unregistered -- fuzex, fuzebi, deploy, call, fuzeplan, merchandize. No PASS or FAIL row changes; this corrects the roster, not the verdict. Verified: `node --test scripts/check-portal-federation-health.selftest.mjs` 5/5 pass (includes the three broken-input proofs and the anti-vacuity check). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaPa3JgrVNtWrGvqQEAEqv
|
| head | created | conclusion |
|---|---|---|
73c30aae |
2026-08-26T05:15:34Z | failure |
455f6adc |
2026-08-26T05:07:04Z | failure |
d44ee551 |
2026-08-26T05:06:58Z | failure |
02c2b449 |
2026-08-26T05:06:53Z | success |
c1c4a1d7 |
2026-08-26T05:06:13Z | success |
So master broke around 05:07Z today, roughly an hour before this branch existed.
No fix ported, because I could not identify one to port. I have deliberately not pushed a speculative change. Two honest limits on the diagnosis:
- I have not isolated the causing merge. The transition sits inside a ~50-second window with several heads completing near-simultaneously, so the success/failure ordering above is concurrent runs on different commits, not sequential states of
master. Attributing it to any one PR from this data would be a guess. - I could not retrieve the failing assertion. The job-logs endpoint redirects to blob storage, which this environment's network policy denies (
CONNECT tunnel failed, 403), and tail-based retrieval returns only post-job output — service-container teardown and Postgres logs. Thetest-results-24.xartifact is on the same blocked host, and the check run carries no output summary.
What the retrievable portion does show is Postgres constraint violations that read as expected negative-path test output (FK violations on apps.organization_id, uniqueness on uq_personal_org_per_owner, portals_slug_unique, portal_domains_domain_unique) rather than an infrastructure fault — the database came up cleanly and served the whole run.
Not re-run. A re-run is only warranted to confirm a failure is not this PR's, and the base-branch evidence already establishes that; spending the one re-run here would tell us nothing new.
This is a pre-existing master regression that needs its own fix, and it blocks every PR in this repo — including this one — until it lands.
Generated by Claude Code
Correction + isolation: the
|
| Commit | PR | Migration added | Backend Tests |
|---|---|---|---|
02c2b449 |
#808 | 010_clock_remoteentry_assets_segment_fix |
✅ success |
d44ee551 |
#809 | 011_apps_organization_id_not_null |
❌ failure |
455f6adc |
#810 | 011_suspend_phantom_fuzequality_builtin |
❌ failure |
73c30aae |
— | — | ❌ failure |
Green at #808's merge commit, red at #809's, red on every run since. The commit timestamps read 08:06/08:07 in +03:00, which is 05:06/05:07 UTC — matching the run times exactly. So my earlier attribution guess toward #810 was also wrong; #810 merged into an already-red master.
Also failing on this head, same root cause
Applications service (unit + integration), Integration Tests, and Notify Team are all red on 03e803dc for the same reason. Not commenting per check — one cause, one note.
Applications service has no usable base-branch comparison: it lives in ci.yml, whose last master run was 2026-08-20. The bisect above stands on Backend Tests, which does run on every master push.
A second, latent defect this surfaced
#809 and #810 each added a migration numbered 011, an hour apart, in the same tree:
backend/applications/src/migrations/011_apps_organization_id_not_null.ts (#809)
backend/applications/src/migrations/011_suspend_phantom_fuzequality_builtin.ts (#810)
Ordering between them is now settled by alphabetical tiebreak rather than intent. Worth fixing regardless of the test failure — neither PR could see the other.
What is still unproven, and why I am not pushing a fix
The bisect identifies which commit, not which assertion. #809 is not a careless change — it updated backend/tests/apps.test.ts (+160), app-registry.unit.test.ts and portal-catalog.integration.test.ts alongside the migration, and the migration itself sets DEFAULT ROOT_ORG_ID before SET NOT NULL, so org-less inserts are backfilled rather than rejected. The FK violations visible in the surviving log fragment supply an organization_id that is simply absent from organizations — consistent with negative-path tests, not obviously the failure.
I cannot read the failing assertion: the job-logs endpoint redirects to blob storage, which this environment's network policy denies (CONNECT tunnel failed, 403); the log is 1718 lines and tail-based retrieval returns only post-job teardown; the test-results-24.x artifact sits on the same blocked host; and the check run carries no output summary. There is no Postgres server available locally to reproduce against.
Guessing whether the fix belongs in #809's migration or in test fixtures — on someone else's change — is exactly the speculative push that costs a cycle and reviewer trust. So: isolation reported, no fix pushed.
This blocks every PR in the repo, not just this one. It also explains why #810's own migration never reached production: fuzequality is still activated there, four hours after it merged.
Generated by Claude Code
…but never inserted master has been red on Backend Tests since 05:07Z today. Bisected to d44ee55 (#809): green on the merge commit before it (02c2b44, #808), red on it and on every run since. This is the cause. #809 added the describe block "GET /api/apps - visibility/org scoping parity, and apps.organization_id NOT NULL". Its beforeAll declares otherOrgId = uuidv4() and then inserts an app with organization_id: otherOrgId -- but never inserts the organizations row. apps.organization_id carries the FK apps_organization_id_foreign, so that insert aborts the whole beforeAll and every test in the block fails. `otherOrgId` appears exactly three times in the file: declaration, assignment, and use as a foreign key. The block never passed. REPRODUCED, not inferred. Stood up the PostgreSQL 16 server already present in the image (no docker daemon in this container, so no compose/kind) and ran CI's own recipe -- workspace-root `npm ci`, `npm run db:init`, then `jest --testPathPattern=apps --runInBand`: before: Tests: 4 failed, 37 passed, 41 total all 4 -> "insert or update on table \"apps\" violates foreign key constraint \"apps_organization_id_foreign\"" after: Tests: 41 passed, 41 total Also ran the job's other pattern, tests/(auth|auth-oidc): 99 passed, 99 total -- so this block was the only failure in Backend Tests, and the fix does not mask a second one. The org is owned by ADMIN_USER_ID because organizations.owner_id is NOT NULL with an FK to users, and both seeded users (admin, demo) are the block's two callers, so neither can be a neutral third party. That does not weaken the BOLA assertion: scopeAppsQuery (src/routes/apps.ts:211) scopes on memberOrgIds ONLY -- membership, never ownership -- and no organization_memberships row is created for this org, so the app stays excluded for both callers exactly as intended. Verified against that function, not assumed. Cleanup deletes both orgs, and only after the apps referencing them are gone: apps.organization_id has no ON DELETE, so the reverse order fails. Rides on this branch because #811 is itself blocked by this failure and cannot go green until it lands; it is a master hotfix, unrelated to #811's own subject. SEPARATE, NOT FIXED HERE: #809 and #810 each added a migration numbered 011 in backend/applications/src/migrations (011_apps_organization_id_not_null and 011_suspend_phantom_fuzequality_builtin), an hour apart, neither able to see the other. Ordering between them is now an alphabetical tiebreak. Renaming a migration that may already have run against a live database is not a change to make blind, so it is flagged rather than folded in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaPa3JgrVNtWrGvqQEAEqv
…db:init Reproducing a CI failure locally (npm run db:init) writes backend/database.sqlite, and nothing ignored it -- so it showed up as an untracked file that a stop-hook or a careless `git add -A` would invite committing. A database binary must never be committed: it churns on every run and can carry real data. Ignored rather than committed, and the stray file removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaPa3JgrVNtWrGvqQEAEqv
…iberately replaced SECOND independent master regression, nine minutes after the first. Fixing the apps fixture (b462827) turned "Run apps routes tests" green and moved the failure to "Generate test coverage" -- which runs the FULL suite, so it was failing all along behind the earlier step. Both steps are red on master's latest run (32933352569); this is the other one. Bisected to 73c30aa (#680, 05:15Z today): "root-membership backfill crashes backend+security when root org id diverges". It changed migration 022 and left rootOrgAbsentGuards.test.ts asserting the pre-fix behaviour. The test named "skips the backfill when the root organization does not exist" supplied a fixture that DOES contain a platform org, just under a different id (legacy-platform-id). Post-#680 that org IS the root org: 022 resolves it the same way ensureRootPortal() does -- prefer ROOT_ORG_ID, else the oldest type='platform' row -- so it adopts and backfills. The fixture contradicted the test's own name. Inverting the assertion back would restore the 2026-08-16 P1 crashloop: with a prod DB whose platform-root org has an id other than ROOT_ORG_ID and no ROOT_ORG_ID row at all (the 2026-07-29 rebuild, 92f2020b-..., slug `fuzefront`), hardcoding ROOT_ORG_ID made every INSERT violate organization_memberships_organization_id_foreign on every boot. The migration is right; the guard was stale. So the assertion is updated to the intended contract, and pinned where it matters: expect(inserts[0].bindings).toContain('legacy-platform-id') expect(inserts[0].bindings).not.toContain(ROOT_ORG_ID) That second line IS the #680 regression, expressed as a test. NOT a weakened test -- coverage of the skip branch is added, not removed. The pre-existing empty-fixture test ({users: [], organizations: []}) cannot distinguish "skipped the backfill" from "had nobody to backfill", so a new case covers the real skip: users present, no platform org, zero membership inserts. Both branches are now genuinely exercised; before this, one was asserted backwards and the other only vacuously. Verified with CI's own command against a local PostgreSQL 16: npx jest --coverage --runInBand --testPathIgnorePatterns="permit-integration|billing-" before: 1 failed, 548 passed, 549 total after: 550 passed, 550 total (41 suites) rootOrgAbsentGuards alone: 7 passed, 7 total. With b462827 this should take Backend Tests green for the first time since 05:07Z, unblocking every PR in the repo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaPa3JgrVNtWrGvqQEAEqv
npm run test:coverage writes ~6.6M of generated HTML + lcov per workspace, and nothing ignored it — so reproducing backend-tests.yml's "Generate test coverage" step locally leaves a large untracked directory that a careless `git add -A` would sweep in. CI produces the same output and ships it to Codecov from the runner; it is never a source artifact. Unanchored (`coverage/`) so it matches any workspace, not just backend/. Second of the same class as backend/database.sqlite: running CI's own recipe locally generated artifacts this repo had no rule for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaPa3JgrVNtWrGvqQEAEqv
… to fail about
THIRD independent master regression from the same 05:06-05:15Z merge burst, and
the only one that is a production hazard rather than a test-only one. Found by
reproducing ci.yml's "Applications service (unit + integration)" job locally --
a DIFFERENT suite from the two already fixed on this branch, which live in
backend/tests (the monolith).
tests/migrations.idempotency.integration.test.ts
✕ is a clean no-op against a pre-existing apps table/enum/columns
✕ creates portal_apps idempotently alongside the pre-existing apps schema
Error: organizations.00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000010 (the platform
root org) does not exist yet -- backend/src migration
015_seed_root_platform_organization must run before this one.
#809 added this migration with an unconditional throw when the root org is
absent. Its stated reasoning is sound and is preserved: backfilling to an
absent id would violate apps_organization_id_foreign, and a clear error beats a
mystery FK stack trace later.
But the guard fired even when there was NOTHING TO BACKFILL. The root org is
seeded by a DIFFERENT deployable's migration tree (backend/src's 015), so any
environment where applications-service migrates first -- including a
fresh/schema-only DB -- hits an exception. A migration that throws is a boot
crashloop, not a warning. That is precisely the 2026-08-16 P1 shape that
backend/src's migration 022 was fixed for, now reintroduced one tree over.
The idempotency test is not incidental: it runs THIS tree, standalone, against
a bare schema, and asserts a clean no-op. That contract is the thing #809 broke.
Narrowed to the case that warrants it:
- root org absent AND org-less rows exist -> still throws, now naming the
count so the operator knows what is at stake
- root org absent AND zero org-less rows -> logs and returns
DEFAULT and NOT NULL are deliberately NOT set in the skip branch: the DEFAULT
would point at a non-existent org and reintroduce the exact FK hazard the guard
exists to prevent.
Two claims I checked rather than assumed, because both would have been wrong:
1. "self-heals on the next boot" -- FALSE under knex, which records the
migration as applied and never re-runs it. What actually closes the gap is
the SIBLING migration on the same shared table, backend/src's 026, in the
tree that also owns 015 and therefore always has the root org by then.
That is its own header's stated contract: "whichever service's migrations
happen to run first against a given database does the real work, and the
other is a no-op". The comment says this, not the convenient version.
2. The query-side half still holds. service.ts's list() may drop its
`organization_id IS NULL` arm only once no row can be null -- and the skip
branch is taken precisely when there are ZERO org-less rows, so nothing
can silently disappear.
Verified locally against PostgreSQL 16 with ci.yml's own recipe (core build,
applications-service type-check, then the suite):
before: 2 failed, 204 passed, 206 total (1 of 14 suites red)
after: 206 passed, 206 total (14 suites)
tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaPa3JgrVNtWrGvqQEAEqv
…rror
An earlier commit on this branch removed `fuzequality` from
scripts/expected-portal-apps.json on the premise that it was not registered.
That premise was wrong, and the live census disproves it.
Census run 32960147607 (2026-08-26 10:49:51Z) against app.fuzefront.com:
fuzequality FuzeQuality activated FAIL https://app.fuzefront.com/apps/
fuzequality/assets/remoteEntry.js — remoteEntry returned 200 but is HTML
(content-type 'text/html') — SPA fallback answering a 404 with 200
It is `activated` in the registry, and it is one of the four entries in
backend's BUILTIN_MANIFESTS (`fuzesocial`, `fuzeagent`, `clock`,
`fuzequality`) — the only four whose slug comes from FuzeFront's own seed. It
is a first-party product that belongs in the expected roster.
The consequence of dropping it was not cosmetic. This file is the ONLY thing
that makes a MISSING app detectable — an app absent from both the registry and
this roster is invisible to the census entirely. Removing a real product
converts it from a detectable failure into a blind spot, which is the exact
failure mode the file exists to prevent (see its `_meta` header).
Worth being precise about what the census result means for it: `fuzequality`
is NOT healthy. It returns a 200 whose body is HTML — an SPA fallback
answering a 404 — which the checker correctly scores as FAIL. Restoring the
entry does not assert the product works; it asserts the product is expected,
so that its brokenness keeps being reported instead of disappearing.
Verified: `node --test scripts/check-portal-federation-health.selftest.mjs`
→ 5/5 pass against the edited roster.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaPa3JgrVNtWrGvqQEAEqv
📋 Description
Scope grew after this PR was opened. The urgent part is the first section, not the last.
masterwent red at 05:07Z today and stayed red; three separate regressions landed inside one nine-minute merge window. Each is reproduced locally against PostgreSQL 16 and confirmed green in this PR's CI.1. Three
masterregressions (the reason this is urgent)otherOrgId, assigned it a UUID and used it as a foreign key — but never inserted the organization rowd44ee551(#809) 05:06ZBackend tests (Node 24.x)rootOrgAbsentGuards.test.tsasserting the contract it had just replaced73c30aae(#680) 05:15Z011threw unconditionally when the root org was absent — including when there was nothing to backfilld44ee551(#809) 05:06ZApplications service (unit + integration)1 —
backend/tests/apps.test.tsotherOrgIdwas a live FK reference to a row that was never created, so every insert against it violatedapps_organization_id_foreign. Fixed by actually inserting the org, and cleaning it up inafterAllalongsidescopedOrgId.2 —
backend/tests/rootOrgAbsentGuards.test.tsBefore #680, migration 022 hardcoded
ROOT_ORG_ID, which crashloopedfuzefront-backendandfuzefront-securityon 2026-08-16 against a prod DB whose platform-root org has a different id (the 2026-07-29 rebuild). #680 correctly changed 022 to resolve the root org the wayensureRootPortal()does — preferROOT_ORG_ID, else the oldesttype='platform'row — but the guard test still demanded a skip for exactly that fixture.The assertion is now the post-#680 contract: the backfill runs, bound to the adopted org's id and never to the constant.
Flipping an assertion removes coverage unless something replaces it, so the genuine "no platform org exists at all" case is added as its own test — with users present deliberately, since the pre-existing empty-fixture test has none and therefore cannot distinguish "skipped the backfill" from "had nobody to backfill".
3 —
backend/applications/src/migrations/011_apps_organization_id_not_null.tsThe root org is seeded by a different deployable's migration tree (
backend/src's015). This service's011threw whenever that row was absent — and a throwing migration is a boot crashloop, not a warning.tests/migrations.idempotency.integration.test.tsruns precisely this tree against a bare schema and expects a clean no-op, so it failed too.The throw is narrowed to the case that warrants it: root org absent and org-less rows actually present to backfill. Otherwise it logs and returns.
Two things worth stating explicitly, because both are easy to get wrong:
backend/src's026_apps_organization_id_not_null, in the tree that also owns015and therefore always has the root org by the time it runs.DEFAULTnorNOT NULL. ADEFAULTpointing at a non-existent org would reintroduce the exact FK hazard the guard exists to prevent.The invariant the query-side half depends on still holds:
service.ts'slist()may drop itsorganization_id IS NULLarm only once no row can be null, and the skip fires precisely when there are zero org-less rows — so nothing that currently appears can silently disappear.2.
fleet-pat-health.yml— the original changeThis workflow is the fleet's only detector for a
GH_RELEASE_PATexpiry. Its own header says "Add new fleet repos here when they receiveGH_RELEASE_PAT." Nine repos hold the secret;FLEET_REPOSnamed three. The other six had no expiry detection at all — the single thing this workflow exists to provide, absent for two thirds of its subjects.GH_RELEASE_PAT=build-and-push.ymlFuzeCall, FuzeDeploy and FuzeMerchandize were provisioned the credential today by FuzeSDLC's
provision-secrets.yml(run 32948657038 — 3×SET GH_RELEASE_PAT), so they are added in the same change rather than left to be noticed later. FuzePlan already held it and was simply never listed.The list is not hand-assembled. It is exactly the repos whose own workflows reference
secrets.GH_RELEASE_PATto bump a prod tag, from the fleet-wide survey inprovision_secrets.py.Two exclusions, on purpose. FuzeFront and FuzeSDLC hold the secret but neither uses it to cut a release — FuzeFront for this health check itself, FuzeSDLC for secret provisioning. Listing them would query a release workflow that does not exist and report a failure that is not one.
The per-repo workflow override isn't cosmetic. That same hazard is live for a repo that is in scope: FuzeMerchandize references the PAT from
build-and-push.yml, notrelease.yml. Querying a workflow file a repo does not have returns the sameCould not queryerror as a genuinely expired credential — indistinguishable in the alert issue. A false alarm here is worse than a missing one: it trains people to ignore the alert this workflow exists to raise. Entries now accept an optional=workflow.ymlsuffix, defaulting toWORKFLOW_FILE(release.yml) when absent.3.
scripts/expected-portal-apps.json— the census roster disagreed with the live registryThe census kept reporting products as "missing" that are in fact registered under different slugs. Reconciled per the file's own
_meta.notASlugMigrationWorklistrule — "If a live registry slug genuinely differs from an entry below, FIX THIS FILE to match the registry — never the other way around":keysfuzekeysfuzecontactcontactfuzehub-venturesfuzehubclockfuzequalityfuzequality, activatedNo slug is edited anywhere.
PUT /apps/{slug}has no rename operation, so changing one registers a second app and strands the first.Correction, made on this branch rather than left in history
An earlier commit here removed
fuzequalityfrom the roster on the premise that it was not registered. That premise was wrong, and commit77096fa1restores it. Live census run 32960147607 (2026-08-26 10:49:51Z) againstapp.fuzefront.com:It is
activated, and it is one of the four entries inBUILTIN_MANIFESTS(fuzesocial,fuzeagent,clock,fuzequality) — the only four whose slug comes from FuzeFront's own seed.The consequence of dropping it was not cosmetic: this file is the only thing that makes a MISSING app detectable, so an app absent from both the registry and the roster is invisible to the census entirely. Removing a real product converts it from a reported failure into a blind spot — the exact failure mode the file exists to prevent.
To be precise about what restoring it claims:
fuzequalityis not healthy — it is the 200-serving-HTML row. The entry asserts the product is expected, so its brokenness keeps being counted rather than disappearing.4. Two
.gitignoreentriesbackend/database.sqlite(written bynpm run db:init) and an unanchoredcoverage/(jest writesbackend/coverage/, which the existing anchored pattern missed). Both were showing up as untracked noise after any local test run.🧪 Testing
77096fa1: 61 checks, 0 failures —Backend tests (Node 24.x),Applications service (unit + integration),Integration Tests,Playwright sign-in flow,OIDC plumbingand the full gate set all green.node --test scripts/check-portal-federation-health.selftest.mjs→ 5/5 pass.fleet-pat-healthYAML parses; the entry parser is exercised directly (plain entries →release.yml, suffixed entry →build-and-push.yml).workflow_dispatchis enabled so the widened list can be run on demand after merge. Baseline: run 32948915104 passed on the old 3-repo list today, includingRequire the release credential, so the PAT itself is valid.🚨 Breaking Changes
None. No production code path changes behaviour: two test fixtures, one migration guard narrowed strictly toward fewer throws, one workflow's watch list, one JSON roster, two ignore rules.
Note on the
auto-mergelabelThis PR was opened by repo automation on push, and that automation applied the
auto-mergelabel — I did not.masterisdeployOnPush: true, so merging is a production deploy; #794 deliberately withheld the label for that reason, while #810 shipped with it earlier today. The owner has since instructed that this PR be merged.