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The e2e job runs on a self-hosted runner on a host with LAN access and live Slack/Spotify credentials on disk, in a public repository. Guard the job on github.actor so it cannot run for anyone else. This is a backstop, not the primary control: a pull request can edit this file, so the repository's fork-PR approval setting is what actually gates untrusted code. Both together.
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if: github.actor == 'htilly'to thee2ejob, plus a comment explaining why.Why: the
e2ejob targets a self-hosted runner on a host that has LAN access and live Slack/Spotify/OpenAI credentials on disk, and this repository is public (38 forks, 136 stars).Scope of the guard — please read: this is a backstop, not the primary control. For
pull_requestevents GitHub uses the workflow files from the PR head, so a PR can simply delete thisif:. The control that actually gates untrusted code is the repository setting Settings → Actions → Fork pull request workflows from outside collaborators → Require approval for all external contributors, which was changed fromfirst_time_contributorstoall_external_contributorsalongside this PR.record-historyis deliberately left unguarded: it runs onubuntu-latest, not the self-hosted runner.Not merged — for your review.