fix(node): gate bounty mutations on repo read before status checks - #448
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…checks
submit, approve, cancel, and dispute on /api/v1/bounties/{id}/* looked the
bounty up and ran status and participant checks without gating on the
bounty's repo read visibility. A signed stranger holding an id got a
distinguishable 400/403 on a private-repo bounty where an absent id gets
404, so the routes were an existence and lifecycle oracle.
Insert the same authorize_repo_read block get_bounty and claim_bounty
already carry, right after the lookup, so a denied caller sees the
not-found shape either way. Participant checks are unchanged; on a public
repo a stranger still reaches them.
Closes Gitlawb#341
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Included review availability: 3 reviews are currently available. Your included PR review attempts over the past 7 days set your current allowance at 5 reviews per hour. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe four bounty mutation handlers now verify repository read access before existing status and participant checks. Authorization failures return not-found responses. Tests compare complete not-found JSON responses for private-repository and absent bounty IDs. ChangesBounty mutation authorization
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Medium Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Caller
participant BountyMutationHandler
participant Database
participant RepositoryAuthorization
Caller->>BountyMutationHandler: Submit, approve, cancel, or dispute bounty
BountyMutationHandler->>Database: Load bounty
Database-->>BountyMutationHandler: Bounty or absent result
BountyMutationHandler->>RepositoryAuthorization: Check repository read access
RepositoryAuthorization-->>BountyMutationHandler: Allow or deny
BountyMutationHandler-->>Caller: Not-found or existing validation response
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to Private-repository bounty mutations now conceal bounty existence from unauthorized callers while preserving existing participant rules. No actionable merge risk remains. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
Comment |
Greptile SummaryThis PR adds repository read-visibility checks to all four ID-keyed bounty mutation handlers and adds signed router-level tests for private- and public-repository behavior.
Confidence Score: 4/5The PR should not merge until authorization infrastructure failures are allowed to retain their 5xx semantics instead of being reported as missing bounties. The visibility gate closes the intended existence oracle, but all four changed handlers also swallow database and internal authorization errors as 404 responses; the accompanying regression assertion is additionally too permissive to preserve the complete denial-body contract. Files Needing Attention: crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/bounties.rs; crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs
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| Filename | Overview |
|---|---|
| crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/bounties.rs | Adds correctly ordered read-visibility gates, but indiscriminately converts authorization infrastructure failures into not-found responses. |
| crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs | Adds production-router coverage for the four gates, though the private-denial helper does not fully compare the denial and absent response shapes. |
Sequence Diagram
sequenceDiagram
participant C as Signed caller
participant H as Bounty mutation handler
participant DB as Database
participant A as Repository read authorization
C->>H: "POST /bounties/{id}/{action}"
H->>DB: get_bounty(id)
alt Bounty absent
H-->>C: 404 bounty not found
else Bounty exists
H->>A: authorize_repo_read(owner, repo, caller, "/")
alt Read denied
H-->>C: 404 bounty not found
else Authorization infrastructure failure
Note over H,A: Current code also converts this to 404
H-->>C: 404 bounty not found
else Read allowed
H->>H: Check lifecycle and participant
H-->>C: Mutation result or validation error
end
end
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Inline comments:
In `@crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs`:
- Around line 14815-14840: The test covering the held private-repository bounty
and the absent bounty ID should validate equivalent not-found response bodies,
not only matching status codes. In the held-ID and absent-ID branches around the
signed_bounty_post requests, capture both JSON bodies and compare them, or
assert the same expected not-found message shape for each.
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crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/bounties.rscrates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs
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- assert the exact not_found body shape for both held and absent bounty ids in the mutation-gate helper, so a denial carrying lifecycle or participant detail fails the test
1 participant
Summary
The four id-keyed bounty mutations (
submit,approve,cancel,dispute) loaded the bounty and ran lifecycle and participant checks without the repo read-visibility gate thatget_bountyandclaim_bountyalready enforce, so any signed caller holding a private-repo bounty id could tell a real bounty (400/403) from a nonexistent one (404) and read its lifecycle state.Motivation & context
Closes #341. Signing is free, so the gate cannot rely on the caller being a known participant. The fix applies the same
authorize_repo_readblock the other handlers use, immediately after the lookup: a denied caller gets the same 404 as a missing bounty, and nothing about status or participants is disclosed.Kind of change
What changed
gitlawb-node:submit_bounty,approve_bounty,cancel_bounty, anddispute_bountyresolve read visibility throughauthorize_repo_readat/right afterget_bounty, before the status and participant checks, matchingget_bounty/claim_bounty. Denial renders the same404 bounty <id> not foundas an absent id.require_signaturemiddleware): a stranger holding a private-repo id gets the same not_found response shape as an absent id on every route, and a stranger on a public repo still reaches the participant checks at 403.How a reviewer can verify
DATABASE_URL=... cargo test --locked --bin gitlawb-node -- bountyRemoving the gate block from any of the four handlers returns 403 instead of 404 on the held-id stranger case (observed on all four routes before the fix).
Also exercised end to end against a live node over HTTP: a signed stranger got the same 404 shape on all four private-repo bounty ids as on absent ids; public-repo strangers still hit participant 403s; an unsigned request got 401.
Before you request review
cargo test --locked --bin gitlawb-nodepasses locally against Postgres (21 bounty/gate tests)cargo fmt --allandcargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warningsare cleanfeat(...),fix(...),docs(...)).env.exampleupdated if behavior or config changed (N/A)Protocol & signing impact
None: authorization-gate change only; request/response shapes unchanged.
Notes for reviewers
The 404-on-deny deliberately matches the read-surface contract, so a denied caller learns nothing about existence. Per the issue, the class-guard blind spot (
every_repo_scoped_handler_is_gateddoes not seePath<String>routes) is a separate follow-up. The same lookup-before-authorize pattern intasks.rsis #268/#395 scope, not this PR.Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests