docs(proof): orgctl tested against a real IAM Identity Center org - #24
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Ran login, whoami, exec, shell, export-env, creds-process, sync-aws-config, check-policy, list-remote, audit-log, and logout for real against a real AWS Organization's Identity Center instance - two real accounts, real device-authorization logins, real ephemeral STS credentials. Exercised all three guardrail mechanisms for real: protected_account_ids (blocked on both exec and shell), deny_patterns, and require_confirmation_patterns (both the decline path and --yes). Every outcome (ok/blocked/cancelled) confirmed in the on-disk audit log with the correct reason recorded. Unlike this tool's earlier fix rounds (see CHANGELOG.md), this pass found nothing broken - documented as a real result rather than manufacturing findings where there weren't any. See docs/PROOF.md for the full claims/evidence table and what this run does not prove (keychain backend, multi-org, GovCloud, CloudWatch audit push, session-expiry cap).
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Ran
login,whoami,exec,shell,export-env,creds-process,sync-aws-config,check-policy,list-remote,audit-log, andlogoutfor real against a real AWS Organization's Identity Center instance — two real accounts, real device-authorization logins, real ephemeral STS credentials.Exercised all three guardrail mechanisms for real:
protected_account_ids(blocked on bothexecandshell),deny_patterns, andrequire_confirmation_patterns(both the decline path and--yes). Every outcome recorded correctly in the on-disk audit log with the right reason.Unlike this tool's earlier fix rounds, this pass found nothing broken. Documented as a genuine result in
docs/PROOF.mdrather than manufacturing findings where there weren't any — full claims/evidence table and what this run does not prove (keychain backend, multi-org, GovCloud, CloudWatch audit push, session-expiry cap, deliberate guardrail-bypass attempts) is there.