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22 changes: 22 additions & 0 deletions SECURITY.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -30,6 +30,27 @@ address critical security vulnerabilities rapidly and post patches as quickly
as possible.


## What do we consider a vulnerability?

We only consider a situation to be a security vulnerability if an untrusted
party can plausibly trigger the flaw through normal product inputs (for
example, a maliciously crafted oso file that might compromise a renderer when
loaded). We do not support requesting a CVE for API-only or caller-controlled
failures with no realistic adversarial path.

The OSL project adopts the same security stance as many other language
compilers: we believe that shaders that will be JITed and executed are by
definition *trusted inputs*, and should not be accepted from untrusted
sources. A shader that causes damage when it faithfully executes is not a
vulnerability per se. In rare circumstances, we might consider it a
vulnerability if a maliciously crafted shader can cause the renderer or OSL
library to do something damaging that is different from what the shader text
implies.

Flaws whose root cause lies in a dependency should be reported and fixed
upstream; the upstream project owns the CVE when one is warranted.


## Other security features

### Signed tags
Expand All @@ -50,3 +71,4 @@ None known

## History of CVE Fixes

None to date